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INCOME TAX-DEDUCTIONS-Lessor's Amortization 
of the Amount by which the Purchase Price 
of Improved Realty Exceeds the Appraised 
Value of Land-Bender v. 
United States* 
Taxpayer, upon being informed that his tenant would not renew 
his lease unless he could be assured of additional parking facilities, 
purchased three lots adjacent to the leasehold and immediately 
demolished the houses thereon in order to provide the necessary 
space. Since the owners of these residential properties knew of 
taxpayer's special need, taxpayer was forced to pay substantially 
more than the total appraised value of the land.1 In computing 
his income tax, taxpayer sought to amortize over the life of the 
lease the cost of razing the buildings and the amount of the pur-
chase price in excess of the appraised value of the land as expendi-
tures incident to securing a lease. The Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, disallowing this amortization deduction, contended that 
since taxpayer bought the improved realty with the intention of 
razing the buildings, the entire purchase price as well as the cost 
of demolition should be allocated to the land which is a nonde-
preciable asset. In a suit for refund of taxes, the federal district 
court reversed the Commissioner's determination and allowed the 
deduction. The court held that when improved realty is purchased 
to secure a lease renewal, the amount by which the purchase price 
exceeds the appraised fair market value of the land alone may be 
amortized by the lessor over the period of the leasehold as a capital 
expenditure incurred for the production or collection of income, 
or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property 
held for the production of income. This is true even though the 
taxpayer intended at the time of the purchase to demolish the 
buildings on the land. 
An expense incurred in securing a lease is generally recognized 
as being a legitimate cost of producing income, and, as such, may 
be deducted under section 212 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954.2 If the lease-term runs more than a year, the securing costs 
• 246 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ohio 1965) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
1. The total appraised fair market value of the three lots was $37,300: $4,100 for the 
land and $33,200 for the buildings. The lots were purchased by taxpayer for a total of 
$75,136.55. Brief for Taxpayer, ,r 8. 
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212, provides in part: 
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the 
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-
(!) for the production or collection of income; 
(2) for the :!Ilanag~ment, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the 
production of mcome. 
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are considered capital expenditures to be amortized over the lease-
term in accordance with section 167 which permits deductions 
for depreciation.3 The court in the principal case recognized that 
the cost of land, even if the land were purchased to secure a lease, 
would not constitute such a capital expenditure because land is 
always considered a non-depreciable capital asset.4 However, since 
the taxpayer was forced to pay a greatly inflated price for the land 
because of his lessee's particular demands, the court felt that tax-
payer had an investment in something more than the non-depreciable 
land; the amount by which the purchase price exceeded the fair 
market value of the land was thus attributable to the ability to 
secure the lease renewal and therefore constituted a deductible 
capital expenditure.5 In allocating to the non-depreciable land 
only that portion of the purchase price equal to the land's appraised 
value and in designating the remainder of the cost as the basis for 
the deduction, the court is subject to criticism for (I) disregarding 
the well-established rule of allocating the total cost of purchased 
realty to the land alone when the buildings thereon are intended to 
be destroyed6 and (2) incorrectly allocating the purchase price be-
tween the land and building, if such an allocation were permitted. 
The Treasury Regulations relating to section 165 which deals 
with deductions for certain losses provide that if a lessor is re-
quired to demolish buildings in order to secure a lease, the adjusted 
basis of the buildings plus the cost of demolition may be amortized 
over the term of the lease.7 However, Treasury Regulation I.165-3(a) 
provides that a loss incurred by the demolition of buildings should 
not be deducted if the intent to demolish is formed at the time of 
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a), provides in part: 
(a) GENERAL RULE-There shall be allowed as depreciation deduction a 
reasonable allowance for the exhaustion ••• 
(I) of property used in the trade or business, or 
(2) of property held for the production of income. 
4. Land is not subject to a depreciation allowance because it suffers no appreciable 
loss of usefulness and because it does not have a determinable life with which to 
measure a period of depreciation. See 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 23.09, 
.12 (1958). 
5. Principal case at 196. 
6. See Providence Journal Co. v. Broderick, 104 F.2d 614 (1st Cir. 1939); Liberty 
Baking Co. v. Heiner, 37 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1930); N.W. Ayer &: Son, 17 T.C. 631 (1951). 
7. Treas. Reg.§ 1.165-3(b) (1960). See also Camp Wolters Land Co. v. Commissioner, 
160 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1947); Spinks Realty Co. v. Burnet, 62 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1932), 
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 636 (1933); Young v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 287 U.S. 652 (1932); Anahma Realty Corp., 16 B.T.A. 749 (1929), affd, 42 
F.2d 128 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 854 (1930); Charles N. Manning, 7 B.T.A. 
286 (1927). 
For examples of other types of capital expenditures which a lessor may include in 
his cost of securing a lease, see Young v. Commissioner, supra (certification of title 
charges); Central Bank Ass'n v. Commissioner, 57 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1932) (attorney fees); 
Laurene W. Berger, 7 T.C. 1339 (1946) (costs of removing buildings from leased land); 
Richard G. Babbage, 27 B.T .A. 57 (1932) (court costs in connection with litigation 
over lease); James M. Butler, 19 B.T.A. 718 (1930) (real estate broker commissions). 
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the purchase of the property. If the purchaser intends to demolish 
the buildings, the regulation states that the entire cost of the 
property is to be allocated to the basis of the land itself. In the 
principal case, the court made a specific finding of fact that the 
taxpayer wanted to obtain only the land and intended at the time 
of purchase to demolish the buildings.8 However, the court refused 
to consider the above regulation, since the taxpayer was not seek-
ing a loss deduction under section 165, but rather was attempting 
to amortize under section 167, a section 212 expenditure for the 
production of income over the term of the renewed lease. Section 
165 is clearly inapplicable, but it appears that the court acted im-
properly in mechanically refusing to include within its analysis of 
the problem presented in the principal case a regulation issued under 
this section. A relationship does exist between sections 165 and 167, 
since both sections provide a means of recovering basis tax free 
and both require that the adjusted basis, as determined by section 
IOll, shall be the guideline for determining the amount of their 
respective deductions. 9 Thus, although the two sections serve differ-
ent purposes, a regulation issued under one would be relevant to 
a problem brought under the other so long as the regulation in-
volves a question of the allocation of basis. The relevance of Trea-
sury Regulation l.165-3(a) to the principal case is thus in its method 
of allocating the purchase price when land and buildings are pur-
chased with the intent to raze the buildings, not in its ultimate 
purpose of allowing or disallowing a loss deduction.10 Although 
8. Principal case at 193. 
9. !NT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 165(b), provides: 
(b) AMOUNT OF DEDUCTION-For purposes of subsection (a), tbe basis for 
determining tbe amount of tbe deduction for any loss shall be tbe adjusted basis 
provided in section 1011 for determining tbe loss from the sale or otber disposition 
of property. 
!NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(g), provides: 
(g) BASIS FOR DEPRECIATION-The basis on which exhaustion, wear and 
tear, and obsolescence are to be allowed in respect of any property shall be tbe 
adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for the purpose of determining tbe gain 
-0n the sale or otber disposition of such property. 
10. The relationship between §§ 165 and 167 for determining basis has been ac• 
knowledged by tbe courts. See Lynchburg Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., 20 T.C. 670, 
aff'd on other grounds, 208 F.2d 757 (4tb Cir. 1953). In Lynchburg a taxpayer intended 
to demolish a building when he purchased it, but used it in his business prior to tbe 
demolition. The Tax Court disallowed depreciation for tbe interim use since tbe 
building had a basis of zero. The brief for the Government in Lynchburg, which 
relied upon § 165 cases, stated: 
While tbese cases involve losses rather tban depreciation and no cases presenting 
this question with respect to depreciation have been found, nevertheless, the prin• 
ciple involved must necessarily be the same with respect to botb questions •••• 
[S]ince tbe property involved was purchased with tbe intention of demolishing 
the brick building, tbe purchase price was properly charged to tbe land, and tbe 
building had a basis of zero, and, in accordance therewith, the taxpayer [must be 
denied] • • • any deduction for depreciation witb respect to tbe building. 
Brief for Commissioner, p. 12. 
The Commissioner will now allow a limited depreciation for interim use of a build-
ing purchased with tbe intent to demolish. See Treas. Reg. § l.165-3(a)(2)(i) (1960). 
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the cases relied upon by the Commissioner involve attempts by 
taxpayers to take loss deductions under section 165,11 the reasoning 
of those decisions is that the actual value to the taxpayer of the de-
sired land is equal to the entire purchase price paid for both land 
and buildings and, therefore, the basis of the land itself should be 
equal to this same amount. If the buildings have no value to the 
purchaser, there can be no loss to him upon their demolition. 
Hence, any appraised value assigned to the buildings at the time 
of purchase is deemed immaterial.12 This reasoning, developed in 
section 165 for loss situations, should also be applicable in the sec-
tion 167 depreciation setting of the principal case. If the lessor in-
tended to destroy the buildings upon their purchase, the entire cost 
should be allocated to the land, and thus no amount is left to be 
assigned to a depreciable lease-renewal expense. 
In other situations in which an aggregate of property is acquired 
for the purpose of obtaining only a specific asset which happens to 
be part of the aggregate, the courts have held that the entire pur-
chase price is to be designated as the basis for that specific asset.13 
For example, when an individual purchased a tavern for the sole 
purpose of acquiring the tavern's liquor license, the court allocated 
the entire cost to the license's basis since the taxpayer intended to 
abandon the tavern.14 
The principal case is unique because in determining the amount 
of the purchase price to be allocated to the amortizable expense, the 
court examined the taxpayer's motives; since it found that the sole 
reason he paid more than the appraised value of the land was so 
that he could secure the lease renewal, this extra amount was 
deemed to be an amortizable expense and, as such, it was not to be 
included in the land's basis.111 In no other case involving a pur-
chase of improved realty where the purchaser intended to raze the 
building has a court made such an examination of the purpose for 
11. See cases dted supra note 6. 
12. See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. Broderick, 104 F.2d 614, 616 (1st Cir. IY!IY); 
Robert B. Griffin, 17 B.T.A. 255, 256 (1929). In addition to the purchase price, the 
cost of removing the unwanted buildings is also added to the land's basis. See, e.g., 
Liberty Baking Co. v. Heiner, S7 F.2d 70?. (Sd Cir. 19?.0). Nor is it important to this 
rationale that the demolition is delayed and the building is used in the meantime. 
See N. W. Ayer&: Son, 17 T.C. 631 (1951); Lansburgh &: Bros., 23 B.T.A. 66 (1931). 
The buildings retain a basis of zero even when the original reason for the demolition 
is abandoned. See Super Markets, Inc. v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 
1961). Also the courts will assign the entire cost as the basis of the land even if the 
intention to demolish is fairly uncertain and depends upon the fulfillment of several 
conditions. See Meyer v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 939 (D. Mass. 1965), afj'd per 
curiam, 362 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1966); The Montgomery Co., 32 P·H Tax Ct. Mem. 541 
(196!J); WLS Investment Co., !JO P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1265 (1961). 
Ill. See 4 REsEAltcR INSTmJTE OF .AMERICA, TAX CoORDINA'I'OR P-1202.6 (1964). 
14. Tube Bar, Inc., 15 T.C. 922 (1950). 
15. Principal case at 196. 
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obtaining the property.16 For example, the court in Bank of Millvale 
v. United States,11 without considering the taxpayer's business rea-
son for constructing a parking lot, automatically refused to allow 
the cost of destroying the buildings on the purchased property to be 
amortized over the life of the parking lot, since they had been pur-
chased with the intent to destroy. The Commissioner has long 
held that no depreciable business expense results from the demoli-
tion of one building to erect another, as long as the razed building 
was purchased with that intent, for the destroyed structure has no 
basis on which to allow an expense deduction upon demolition.18 
None of the cases employed by the court to substantiate its theory 
of designating the excess of price over the fair market value of the 
land as a lease-renewal expense involved a situation in which a 
taxpayer bought the improved realty intending at the time of pur-
chase to demolish the structure thereon.19 Consequently, these cases 
did not present circumstances which would warrant the application 
of Treasury Regulation l.165-3(a). 
The more recent case of Meyer v. United States held the principal 
case to be an "unsound precedent."20 As in the principal case, the 
taxpayer-lessor purchased improved realty and destroyed the build-
ings thereon in order to secure a lease. In Meyer, the court used the 
rationale of Treasury Regulation l.165-3(a) to show that the entire 
cost had to be designated as the basis for the land, thus leaving noth-
ing to be attributed to the deductible cost of securing a lease.21 
16. The sole exception to the rule of not examining either the purchaser's motive 
for buying or the value of the asset purchased in determining the proper basis of the 
acquired property appears to occur in the setting of medical expenses under INT. 
R.Ev. ConE OF 1954, § 213. Usually, when one makes a capital expenditure for perma-
nent improvement to his property, the entire cost will simply be added to the basis 
of his property. However, if the cost also qualifies as a § 213 medical expenditure, 
the Commissioner will allow as a deduction that portion of the expense which ex-
ceeds the increase in the value of the related property. Thus, if a person with a 
heart disease is forced to install an elevator in his home at a cost of $1,000 and this 
results in a $700 increase in the value of his residence, the difference ($300) is de-
ductible as a medical expense while the basis of the taxpayer's home will be increased 
by $700. See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-l(e)(iii) (1964). 
17. 62-1 CCH Tax Cases 83,309 (W.D. Pa. 1961). 
18. Rev. Rul. llO, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 280. 
19. The court's decision was based upon World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 
299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962) (purchaser of property subject to lease may amortize por-
tion of price allocable to tenant-erected building which will be valueless before end of 
lease-term); Millinery Center Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1955), 
afj'd on other grounds, 350 U.S. 456 (1956) (where taxpayer, who had erected on leased 
premises a building which was to be surrendered to the lessor at the termination of 
lease, purchased the premises, taxpayer was entitled to allocate part of the purchase 
price to the building and to depreciate it as such, even though taxpayer had fully 
written off the cost of the building during the first term of lease); and Camp 
Wolters Land Co. v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1947) (basis of building 
demolished to secure lease constitutes expense amortizable over period of lease). 
20. 247 F. Supp. 939 (D. Mass. 1965), afj'd per curiam, 362 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1966). 
21. In Meyer the court pointed out that Treas. Reg. § l.165-3(a) (1960) is the lineal 
descendant of a 1918 Regulation-Article 142 of Regulation 45-and that the series oi 
December 1966] Recent Developments 371 
The }.feyer court's conclusion as to the soundness of the decision 
in the principal case is apparently well founded. If the reasoning 
of the principal case were considered valid, it appears that a lessor 
might be able to amortize that portion of the purchase price which 
exceeds the appraised value of the land as a section 212 expenditure 
even when unimproved realty is purchased to secure a lease. For 
example, if a business is planning to expand its facilities by pur-
chasing neighboring land and the business is forced to pay an in-
flated price because of the seller's knowledge of the proposed ex-
pansion, the principal case suggests that the company could deduct 
the premium paid as a section 162 business expense. Such a result, 
however, would be wholly inconsistent with the principle that land 
is a non-depreciable asset, the basis of which is to be measured by 
its actual cost and not by its value. 
Assuming arguendo the validity of the court's contention that 
the purchase price is to be divided between the land and the addi-
tional expense of securing a lease, it would appear that the court 
was incorrect in allocating to the land only that portion of the cost 
equal to the land's appraised value.22 As long as the purchase is an 
arm's length transaction, the basis of property is generally considered 
to be the cost of such property whether such cost is more or less than 
the fair market or appraised value.23 In determining the· basis of 
the taxpayer's capital asset, the court should, therefore, consider 
exactly what he paid for it, which is not to be confused with what 
the property was actually worth.24 Where, as here, an aggregate of 
property is purchased for a single price, it is necessary to apportion 
that price among the assets.25 Although there is no provision in the 
Code, nor in any previous code, establishing a method for such 
an apportionment, the courts have consistently followed the method 
presented in Treasury Regulation l.167(a)-5, whereby allocation is 
made in proportion to the relative values at the time of acquisi-
regulations, substantially unchanged over nearly half a century, may be said to be 
approved by Congressional silence. Meyer v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 939, 942 (D. 
Mass. 1965), afj'd per curiam, 362 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1966). Congress had the oppor-
tunity to end its silence when bills on the allocation-of-basis problem were proposed 
in the 83d and 84th Congresses. H.R. 7598, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); H.R. 665, 84th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). These measures called for a new section to the Code which 
would provide that the basis of buildings intended to be demolished at the time of 
purchase be the same that it would be had they been acquired without such an intent. 
For a discussion on the need for passage of such a basis provision, see Bullock, Are 
We Parked in a Tax Zone?, 33 TAXES 115 (1955). Neither the House Committee on 
,vays and Means nor the Senate Committee on Finance has taken any action on these 
proposals. 
22. Principal case at 197. 
23. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1012, provides in part: "The basis of property shall 
be the cost of such property .•.. " See also Virgil P. Ettinger, 36 B.T.A. 264 (1937), 
afj'd per curiam, 97 F.2d 1000 (1938); Hugh M. Matheson, 31 B.T.A. 493 (1934), affd, 
82 F.2d 380 (1936). 
24. See 4 REsEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TA.X COORDINATOR P-1104 (1964). 
25. See 3A MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 21.32 (1958). 
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tion.2~ In the principal case, the relative values of the assets could 
be determined by comparing the appraised value of the land with 
the appraised value of the improved realty. That proportion of the 
purchase price would then constitute the basis for the land. More-
over, in its use of the appraised value, the court overlooked the fact 
that the appraisal assumed a residential use of the property and a 
buyer under no compulsion, two elements which were not actually 
present in the facts of the case. 27 Also, the court determined the 
value of the three lots by simply totaling the values of each lot 
appraised individually, although it is very likely that the three lots as 
a unit might have been appraised at a higher value.28 
The judgment of the court in the principal case may have un-
derstandably been affected by the excessive disparity between the 
purchase price and the appraised value of the land. Another court, 
faced with a taxpayer similarly situated, might allow the taxpayer 
to amortize at least the amount by which the purchase price ex-
ceeds the cost of both the land and the buildings rather than the 
amount paid in excess of the cost attributed to the land alone. Al-
though more realistic, this approach may also be unacceptable, for 
it would still violate the rule that the motives of the taxpayer are 
not to be examined when designating bases to property. Further-
more, the adoption of such a method of allocation of bases would 
lead to tremendous administrative problems regarding the valuation 
of the acquired property, since everyone purchasing property in the 
course of a trade or business at an inflated price would be certain to 
seek deduction or amortization treatment to the extent of the 
premium paid. 
26. Treas, Reg. § l.167(a)-5 (1956) provides that, if there is a purchase of a combi• 
nation of depreciable and non-depreciable property for a lump sum, as, for example, 
building and land, the basis for depreciation cannot exceed an amount, which bears 
the same. proportion to the lump sum as the value of the depreciable property bears 
to the value of the entire property at that time, If this proportion method were used 
in the principal case, the amount of the amortizable asset would have been approxi• 
mately $67,500 rather than $71,000. See Piedmont Nat'l Bank v. United States, 162 
F. Supp. 919 (W.D.S.C. 1958); Mark L Gerstle. 88 B.T.A. 880 (1985). 
27. Brief for Taxpayer, ,r 8. 
28. Cf. See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N.J. Eq. 86, 49-50 (1905). 
